Safety Verification and Robustness Analysis of Neural Networks via
  Quadratic Constraints and Semidefinite Programming by Fazlyab, Mahyar et al.
Safety Verification and Robustness Analysis of Neural Networks via
Quadratic Constraints and Semidefinite Programming
Mahyar Fazlyab 1 Manfred Morari 1 George J. Pappas 1
Abstract
Analyzing the robustness of neural networks
against norm-bounded uncertainties and adversar-
ial attacks has found many applications ranging
from safety verification to robust training. In this
paper, we propose a semidefinite programming
(SDP) framework for safety verification and ro-
bustness analysis of neural networks with general
activation functions. Our main idea is to abstract
various properties of activation functions (e.g.,
monotonicity, bounded slope, bounded values,
and repetition across layers) with the formalism of
quadratic constraints. We then analyze the safety
properties of the abstracted network via the S-
procedure and semidefinite programming. Com-
pared to other semidefinite relaxations proposed
in the literature, our method is less conservative,
especially for deep networks, with an order of
magnitude reduction in computational complex-
ity. Furthermore, our approach is applicable to
any activation functions.
1. Introduction
Neural networks have become increasingly effective at many
difficult machine-learning tasks. However, the nonlinear and
large-scale nature of neural networks make them hard to
analyze and, therefore, they are mostly used as black-box
models without formal guarantees. In particular, neural net-
works are highly vulnerable to attacks, or more generally,
uncertainty in the input. In the context of image classifica-
tion, for example, neural networks can be easily deluded
into changing their classification labels by slightly perturb-
ing the input image. Indeed, it has been shown that even
imperceptible perturbations in the input of the state-of-the-
art neural networks cause natural images to be misclassified
with high probability (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017). These
perturbations can be either of an adversarial nature (Szegedy
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et al., 2013), or they could merely occur due to compression,
resizing, and cropping (Zheng et al., 2016). As another
example, in the space of malware classification, the exis-
tence of adversarial examples not only limits their potential
application settings but entirely defeats its purpose. These
drawbacks limit the adoption of neural networks in safety-
critical applications such as self-driving vehicles (Bojarski
et al., 2016), aircraft collision avoidance procedures (Julian
et al., 2016), speech recognition, and recognition of voice
commands; see (Xiang et al., 2018a) for a survey.
Motivated by the serious consequences of the fragility of
neural networks to input uncertainties or adversarial at-
tacks, there has been an increasing effort in developing
tools to measure or improve the robustness of neural net-
works. Many results focus on specific adversarial attacks
and make an attempt to harden the network by, for example,
crafting hard-to-classify examples (Goodfellow et al.; Ku-
rakin et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016). Although these methods are scalable and work
well in practice, they still suffer from false negatives. Safety-
critical applications require provable robustness against any
bounded variations in the input data. As a result, many
tools have recently been used, adapted, or developed for
this purpose, such as mixed-integer linear programming
(Bastani et al., 2016; Lomuscio & Maganti, 2017; Tjeng
et al., 2017), robust optimization and duality theory (Kolter
& Wong, 2017; Dvijotham et al., 2018), Satisfiability Mod-
ulo Theory (SMT) (Pulina & Tacchella, 2012), dynamical
systems (Ivanov et al., 2018; Xiang et al., 2018b), Abstract
Interpretation (Mirman et al., 2018) and many others (Hein
& Andriushchenko, 2017). All these works aim at bounding
the worst-case value of a performance measure when their
input is perturbed within a specified range.
In this paper, we develop a semidefinite program (SDP)
for safety verification and robustness analysis of neural net-
works against norm-bounded uncertainties in the input. Our
main idea is to abstract the nonlinear activation functions
by the constraints they impose on the pre- and post- acti-
vation values. In particular, we describe various properties
of activation functions using quadratic constraints, such as
bounded slope, bounded values, monotonicity, and repeti-
tion across layers. Using this abstraction, any properties
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(e.g., safety or robustness) that we can guarantee for the
“abstracted” network will automatically be satisfied by the
original network as well. The quadratic form of these con-
straints allows us to formulate the problem as an SDP. Our
main tool for developing the SDP is the S-procedure from
robust control, which allows us to reason about multiple
quadratic constraints. As a notable advantage, we can ana-
lyze networks with any combination of activation functions
across the layers. In this paper, we focus on a canonical
problem (formally stated in §2.1) that can be adapted to
other closely related problems such as sensitivity analysis
with respect to input perturbations, output reachable set
estimation, adversarial training examples generation, and
near-duplicate detection.
1.1. Related Work
The performance of certification algorithms for neural net-
works can be measured along three axes. The first axis is the
tightness of the certification bounds; the second axis is the
computational complexity, and, the third axis is applicability
across various models (e.g. different activation functions).
These axes conflict. For instance, the conservatism of the
algorithm is typically at odds with the computational com-
plexity. On the other hand, generalizable algorithms tend
to be more conservative. The relative advantage of any
of these algorithms is application specific. For example,
reachability analysis and safety verification applications call
for less conservative algorithms, whereas in robust training,
computationally fast algorithms are desirable (Weng et al.,
2018).
On the one hand, formal verification techniques such as
Satisfiability Modulo (SMT) solvers (Ehlers, 2017; Huang
et al., 2017; Katz et al., 2017), or integer programming ap-
proaches (Lomuscio & Maganti, 2017; Tjeng et al., 2017)
rely on combinatorial optimization to provide tight certifi-
cation bounds for piece-wise linear networks, whose com-
plexity scales exponentially with the size of the network in
the worst-case. A notable work to improve scalability is
(Tjeng et al., 2017), where the authors do exact verification
of piecewise-linear networks using mixed-integer program-
ming with an order of magnitude reduction in computational
cost via tight formulations for non-linearities and careful
preprocessing.
On the other hand, certification algorithms based on con-
tinuous optimization are more scalable but less accurate. A
notable work in this category is reported in (Kolter & Wong,
2017), where the authors propose a linear-programming
(LP) relaxation of piece-wise linear networks and provide
upper bounds on the worst-case loss using weak duality. The
main advantage of this work is that the proposed algorithm
solely relies on forward- and back-propagation operations
on a modified network, and thus is easily integrable into
existing learning algorithms. In (Raghunathan et al., 2018a),
the authors propose an SDP relaxation of one-layer sigmoid-
based neural networks based on bounding the worst-case
loss with a first-order Taylor expansion. Finally, the closest
work to the present work is (Raghunathan et al., 2018b), in
which the authors propose a semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
for certifying robustness of piece-wise linear multi-layer
neural networks. This technique provides tighter bounds
than that of (Kolter & Wong, 2017), although it is less scal-
able.
Our contribution. The present work, which also relies on
an SDP relaxation, has the following features:
• We use various forms of quadratic constraints (QCs) to
abstract any type of activation function.
• Our method is able to capture the cross-coupling be-
tween neurons across different layers, thereby reducing
conservatism. This feature becomes particularly effec-
tive for deep networks, see §6 and Figure 5.
• We can control the trade-off between computational
complexity and conservatism by systematically includ-
ing or excluding different types of QCs.
• For one-layer neural networks, the proposed SDP of-
fers an order of magnitude reduction in computational
complexity compared to (Raghunathan et al., 2018b)
while preserving the accuracy. In particular, there are
O(N) decision variables (where N is the total num-
ber of neurons), while the SDP of (Raghunathan et al.,
2018b) has O(N2) decision variables.
• For multi-layer neural networks, the SDP of the present
work–with all possible QCs included–is more accurate
than that of (Raghunathan et al., 2018b) with the same
computational complexity.
The main drawback of our approach (and all SDP-based
approaches) is the limited scalability of SDPs in general. To
overcome this issue for the case of deep networks with more
than (roughly) five thousands of neurons, we propose to
adopt a modular approach, in which we analyze the network
layer by layer via solving a sequence of small SDPs, as
opposed to a single large one. This approach mitigates the
scalability issues but induces more conservatism.
1.2. Notation and Preliminaries
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of real n-
dimensional vectors by Rn, the set of m× n-dimensional
matrices by Rm×n, and the n-dimensional identity matrix
by In. We denote by Sn, Sn+, and Sn++ the sets of n-by-
n symmetric, positive semidefinite, and positive definite
matrices, respectively. The p-norm (p ≥ 1) is displayed by
‖ · ‖p : Rn → R+.
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declared safe declared unsafe
Figure 1. The output set (in blue), the boundary of its over-
approximation (in red), and the hyperplane characterizing the safe
region (in black). Left: The network is deemed safe since Y˜ ⊆ S.
Right: The network is deemed unsafe since Y˜ 6⊆ S.
2. Safety and Robustness Analysis
2.1. Problem Statement
Consider the nonlinear vector-valued function y =
f(x) : Rnx → Rny described by a multi-layer feed-forward
neural network. Given a bounded set X ⊂ Rnx of possible
inputs (e.g., adversarial examples), the neural network maps
X to an output set Y given by
Y = f(X ) := {y : y = f(x), x ∈ X}. (1)
The desirable properties that we would like to verify can
often be represented by a safety specification set S in the
output space of the neural network. In this context, the net-
work is safe if the output set lies within the safe region, i.e.,
if the inclusion Y ⊆ S holds. In the context of image classi-
fication, for example, a popular choice are perturbations in
the `∞ norm, i.e., X = {x : ‖x− x?‖∞ ≤ }, where x? is
a correctly classified test image, X is the set of all possible
images obtained by perturbing each pixel of x? by ±, Y is
the set of all perturbed logit inputs to the classifier, and S is
the set of all logit values that produce the same label as x?.
Then the condition Y ⊆ S guarantees that the network will
assign the same label to all images in X (local robustness).
Checking the condition Y ⊆ S , however, requires an exact
computation of the nonconvex set Y , which is very difficult.
Instead, our interest is in finding a non-conservative outer
approximation Y˜ of Y and verifying the safety properties
by checking the condition Y˜ ⊆ S. This approach detects
all false negatives but also produces false positives, whose
rate depends on the tightness of the over-approximation–see
Figure 1. The goal of this paper is to solve this problem for
a broad class of input uncertainties and safety specification
sets using semidefinite programming.
2.2. Neural Network Model
For the model of the neural network, we consider an `-layer
feed-forward neural network f(x) : X → Y described by
the following recursive equations:
x0 = x, (2)
xk+1 = φ(W kxk + bk) k = 0, · · · , `− 1,
f(x) = W `x` + b`.
where x0 = x ∈ X is the input to the network, X is a
bounded uncertainty set, W k, bk are the weight matrix
and bias vector of the k-th layer. The nonlinear activation
function φ(·) (ReLU, sigmoid, tanh, leaky ReLU, etc.) is
applied coordinate-wise to the pre-activation vectors, i.e., it
is of the form
φ(x) = [ϕ(x1) · · · ϕ(xd)]>, (3)
where ϕ is the activation function of each individual neuron.
The output f(x) depends on the specific application we
are considering. For example, in image classification with
cross-entropy loss, f(x) represents the logit input to the
softmax function; or, in feedback control, x is the input to
the neural network controller (e.g., tracking error) and f(x)
is the control input to the plant.
3. Problem Abstraction via Quadratic
Constraints
In this section, our goal is to provide an abstraction of the
verification problem that can be converted into a semidefi-
nite program. Our main tool is Quadratic Constraints (QCs),
which were first developed in the context of robust control
(Megretski & Rantzer, 1997) for describing nonlinear, time-
varying, or uncertain components of a system but we adapt
it here for our purposes. We start off with the abstraction of
the uncertainty set X using QCs.
3.1. Input uncertainty
We now provide a particular way of representing the input
set X that will prove useful for developing the SDP.
Definition 1 Let X ⊂ Rd be a nonempty set. Suppose P is
the set of all symmetric matrices P such that[
x
1
]>
P
[
x
1
]
≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . (4)
We then say that X satisfies the QC defined by P .
Note that by definition, P is a convex cone. Furthermore,
we can write
X ⊆
⋂
P∈P
{
x :
[
x
1
]>
P
[
x
1
]
≥ 0
}
. (5)
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In other words, we can over-approximate X by expressing it
as a possibly infinite intersection of sets defined by quadratic
inequalities.
Proposition 1 (QC for hyper-rectangle) The hyper-
rectangle X = {x ∈ Rd : x ≤ x ≤ x¯} satisfies the
quadratic constraint defined by
P=
{[ −(Γ + Γ>) Γx+ Γ>x¯
x>Γ> + x¯>Γ −x>Γ>x¯−x¯>Γx
]}
, (6)
where Γ ∈ Rd×d, Γij ≥ 0 for all i, j.
Our particular focus in this paper is on perturbations in `∞
norm, X = {x : ‖x − x?‖∞ ≤ }, which are a particular
class of hyper-rectangles with x = x?−1 and x¯ = x?+1.
We can adapt the result of Proposition 1 to other uncertainty
sets such as polytopes, zonotopes, and ellipsoids. We do
not elaborate on these attack models in this paper. We
instead assume that the uncertainty set can be abstracted by
a quadratic constraint of the form (4). We will see in §4 that
the matrix P ∈ P appears as a decision variable in the SDP.
In this way, we can optimize the outer approximation of
X to minimize the conservatism of the specific verification
problem we want to solve.
3.2. Safety Specification Set
In our framework, we can consider specification sets that can
be represented (or inner approximated) by the intersection
of finitely many quadratic inequalities:
S =
⋂
i
{
y ∈ Rny :
[
y
1
]>
Si
[
y
1
]
≤ 0
}
, (7)
where the Si are given. This characterization includes ellip-
soids and polytopes in particular. For instance, for a safety
specification set described by the polytope
S = ∩i
{
y ∈ Rny : a>i y − bi ≤ 0
}
,
the Si are given by
Si =
[
0 ai
a>i −2bi
]
.
3.3. Abstraction of Nonlinearities by Quadratic
Constraints
One of the main difficulties in the analysis of neural net-
works is the presence of nonlinear activation functions. To
simplify the analysis, instead of analyzing the network di-
rectly, our main idea is to remove the nonlinear activation
functions from the network but retain the constraints they
impose on the pre- and post-activation signals. Using this ab-
straction, any properties (e.g., safety or robustness) that we
can guarantee for the constrained network will automatically
be satisfied by the original network as well. In the following,
we show how we can encode many of the important proper-
ties of the activation functions (e.g., monotonicity, bounded
slope, and bounded values) using quadratic constraints. We
first provide the formal definition below.
Definition 2 Let φ : Rd → Rd and suppose Q ⊂ S2d+1 is
the set of all symmetric and indefinite matrices Q such that
the inequality  xφ(x)
1
>Q
 xφ(x)
1
 ≥ 0, (8)
holds for all x ∈ Rd. Then we say φ satisfies the quadratic
constraint defined by Q.
We remark that our definition of a quadratic constraint
slightly differs from the one used in robust control (Megret-
ski & Rantzer, 1997), by including a constant in the vector
surrounding the matrix Q, which allows us to incorporate
affine constraints (e.g. bounded nonlinearities).
The derivation of quadratic constraints is function specific
but there are certain rules that can be used for all of them
which we describe below.
3.3.1. SLOPE-RESTRICTED NONLINEARITIES
Consider the nonlinear function φ : Rd → Rd with φ(0) =
0. We say that φ is sector-bounded in the sector [α, β]
(0 ≤ α ≤ β) if the following condition holds for all x ∈ Rd:
(φ(x)− αx)>(φ(x)− βx) ≤ 0. (9)
Intuitively (and for the one-dimensional case d = 1), this in-
equality means that the function y = φ(x) lies in the sector
formed by the lines y = αx and y = βx. As an example, the
ReLU function max(0, x) belongs to the sector [0, 1]. The
sector condition, however, does not impose any restriction
on the slope of the function. This motivates a more accurate
description of nonlinearities that have bounded slope.
Definition 3 (slope-restricted nonlinearity) A nonlinear
function φ(x) : Rd → Rd is slope-restricted on [α, β]
(0 ≤ α ≤ β) if
(φ−φ? − α(x−x?))>(φ−φ? − β(x−x?)) ≤ 0, (10)
for any two pairs (x, φ) and (x?, φ?), where φ = φ(x) and
φ? = φ(x?) with an abuse of notation.
For the one-dimensional case (d = 1), the slope restriction
condition in (10) states that the chord connecting any two
points on the curve of the function y = φ(x) has a slope
that is at least α and at most β:
α ≤ φ(x)− φ(x
?)
x− x? ≤ β ∀x, x
? ∈ R. (11)
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<latexit sha1_b ase64="k9vcboqg+J7uW1FX44sob6 1+KTs=">AAAB83icbZDNSgMxFIXv 1L9a/6ou3QRboW7KTBF0WXDjsoJth c5QMmmmDc1kQpIplqGv4caFIm59GX e+jWk7C209EPg4917uzQklZ9q47r dT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2dpIr QNkl4oh5DrClngrYNM5w+SkVxHHLa Dce383p3QpVmiXgwU0mDGA8FixjB xlp+1Z9gJUes9nRZ7Zcrbt1dCK2Dl 0MFcrX65S9/kJA0psIQjrXuea40QY aVYYTTWclPNZWYjPGQ9iwKHFMdZI ubZ+jCOgMUJco+YdDC/T2R4VjraRz azhibkV6tzc3/ar3URDdBxoRMDRVk uShKOTIJmgeABkxRYvjUAiaK2VsR GWGFibExlWwI3uqX16HTqHuW7xuV5 lUeRxHO4Bxq4ME1NOEOWtAGAhKe4R XenNR5cd6dj2VrwclnTuGPnM8f29 GQ2Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_b ase64="k9vcboqg+J7uW1FX44sob6 1+KTs=">AAAB83icbZDNSgMxFIXv 1L9a/6ou3QRboW7KTBF0WXDjsoJth c5QMmmmDc1kQpIplqGv4caFIm59GX e+jWk7C209EPg4917uzQklZ9q47r dT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2dpIr QNkl4oh5DrClngrYNM5w+SkVxHHLa Dce383p3QpVmiXgwU0mDGA8FixjB xlp+1Z9gJUes9nRZ7Zcrbt1dCK2Dl 0MFcrX65S9/kJA0psIQjrXuea40QY aVYYTTWclPNZWYjPGQ9iwKHFMdZI ubZ+jCOgMUJco+YdDC/T2R4VjraRz azhibkV6tzc3/ar3URDdBxoRMDRVk uShKOTIJmgeABkxRYvjUAiaK2VsR GWGFibExlWwI3uqX16HTqHuW7xuV5 lUeRxHO4Bxq4ME1NOEOWtAGAhKe4R XenNR5cd6dj2VrwclnTuGPnM8f29 GQ2Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_b ase64="k9vcboqg+J7uW1FX44sob6 1+KTs=">AAAB83icbZDNSgMxFIXv 1L9a/6ou3QRboW7KTBF0WXDjsoJth c5QMmmmDc1kQpIplqGv4caFIm59GX e+jWk7C209EPg4917uzQklZ9q47r dT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2dpIr QNkl4oh5DrClngrYNM5w+SkVxHHLa Dce383p3QpVmiXgwU0mDGA8FixjB xlp+1Z9gJUes9nRZ7Zcrbt1dCK2Dl 0MFcrX65S9/kJA0psIQjrXuea40QY aVYYTTWclPNZWYjPGQ9iwKHFMdZI ubZ+jCOgMUJco+YdDC/T2R4VjraRz azhibkV6tzc3/ar3URDdBxoRMDRVk uShKOTIJmgeABkxRYvjUAiaK2VsR GWGFibExlWwI3uqX16HTqHuW7xuV5 lUeRxHO4Bxq4ME1NOEOWtAGAhKe4R XenNR5cd6dj2VrwclnTuGPnM8f29 GQ2Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_b ase64="k9vcboqg+J7uW1FX44sob6 1+KTs=">AAAB83icbZDNSgMxFIXv 1L9a/6ou3QRboW7KTBF0WXDjsoJth c5QMmmmDc1kQpIplqGv4caFIm59GX e+jWk7C209EPg4917uzQklZ9q47r dT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2dpIr QNkl4oh5DrClngrYNM5w+SkVxHHLa Dce383p3QpVmiXgwU0mDGA8FixjB xlp+1Z9gJUes9nRZ7Zcrbt1dCK2Dl 0MFcrX65S9/kJA0psIQjrXuea40QY aVYYTTWclPNZWYjPGQ9iwKHFMdZI ubZ+jCOgMUJco+YdDC/T2R4VjraRz azhibkV6tzc3/ar3URDdBxoRMDRVk uShKOTIJmgeABkxRYvjUAiaK2VsR GWGFibExlWwI3uqX16HTqHuW7xuV5 lUeRxHO4Bxq4ME1NOEOWtAGAhKe4R XenNR5cd6dj2VrwclnTuGPnM8f29 GQ2Q==</latexit>
x
<latexit sha1_base64="KHNV/ SoulMWW9bzZT3DKEVVJbTo=">AAAB6nicbZBNSwMxEIZn61etX1WP XoKt4KnsFkGPBS8eK9pWaJeSTWfb0Gx2SbJiWfoTvHhQxKu/yJv/x rTdg7a+EHh4Z4bMvEEiuDau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVvHqWL YYrGI1UNANQousWW4EfiQKKRRILATjK9n9c4jKs1jeW8mCfoRHUoe ckaNte6qT9V+ueLW3LnIKng5VCBXs1/+6g1ilkYoDRNU667nJsbPq DKcCZyWeqnGhLIxHWLXoqQRaj+brzolZ9YZkDBW9klD5u7viYxGWk +iwHZG1Iz0cm1m/lfrpia88jMuk9SgZIuPwlQQE5PZ3WTAFTIjJhY oU9zuStiIKsqMTadkQ/CWT16Fdr3mWb6tVxoXeRxFOIFTOAcPLqEBN 9CEFjAYwjO8wpsjnBfn3flYtBacfOYY/sj5/AGZHo1I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KHNV/ SoulMWW9bzZT3DKEVVJbTo=">AAAB6nicbZBNSwMxEIZn61etX1WP XoKt4KnsFkGPBS8eK9pWaJeSTWfb0Gx2SbJiWfoTvHhQxKu/yJv/x rTdg7a+EHh4Z4bMvEEiuDau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVvHqWL YYrGI1UNANQousWW4EfiQKKRRILATjK9n9c4jKs1jeW8mCfoRHUoe ckaNte6qT9V+ueLW3LnIKng5VCBXs1/+6g1ilkYoDRNU667nJsbPq DKcCZyWeqnGhLIxHWLXoqQRaj+brzolZ9YZkDBW9klD5u7viYxGWk +iwHZG1Iz0cm1m/lfrpia88jMuk9SgZIuPwlQQE5PZ3WTAFTIjJhY oU9zuStiIKsqMTadkQ/CWT16Fdr3mWb6tVxoXeRxFOIFTOAcPLqEBN 9CEFjAYwjO8wpsjnBfn3flYtBacfOYY/sj5/AGZHo1I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KHNV/ SoulMWW9bzZT3DKEVVJbTo=">AAAB6nicbZBNSwMxEIZn61etX1WP XoKt4KnsFkGPBS8eK9pWaJeSTWfb0Gx2SbJiWfoTvHhQxKu/yJv/x rTdg7a+EHh4Z4bMvEEiuDau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVvHqWL YYrGI1UNANQousWW4EfiQKKRRILATjK9n9c4jKs1jeW8mCfoRHUoe ckaNte6qT9V+ueLW3LnIKng5VCBXs1/+6g1ilkYoDRNU667nJsbPq DKcCZyWeqnGhLIxHWLXoqQRaj+brzolZ9YZkDBW9klD5u7viYxGWk +iwHZG1Iz0cm1m/lfrpia88jMuk9SgZIuPwlQQE5PZ3WTAFTIjJhY oU9zuStiIKsqMTadkQ/CWT16Fdr3mWb6tVxoXeRxFOIFTOAcPLqEBN 9CEFjAYwjO8wpsjnBfn3flYtBacfOYY/sj5/AGZHo1I</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KHNV/ SoulMWW9bzZT3DKEVVJbTo=">AAAB6nicbZBNSwMxEIZn61etX1WP XoKt4KnsFkGPBS8eK9pWaJeSTWfb0Gx2SbJiWfoTvHhQxKu/yJv/x rTdg7a+EHh4Z4bMvEEiuDau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVvHqWL YYrGI1UNANQousWW4EfiQKKRRILATjK9n9c4jKs1jeW8mCfoRHUoe ckaNte6qT9V+ueLW3LnIKng5VCBXs1/+6g1ilkYoDRNU667nJsbPq DKcCZyWeqnGhLIxHWLXoqQRaj+brzolZ9YZkDBW9klD5u7viYxGWk +iwHZG1Iz0cm1m/lfrpia88jMuk9SgZIuPwlQQE5PZ3WTAFTIjJhY oU9zuStiIKsqMTadkQ/CWT16Fdr3mWb6tVxoXeRxFOIFTOAcPLqEBN 9CEFjAYwjO8wpsjnBfn3flYtBacfOYY/sj5/AGZHo1I</latexit>
↵x
<latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lRgA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnft b6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZhdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9f YjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/t W5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBaSK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3RzsvzrvzsWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lRgA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnft b6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZhdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9f YjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/t W5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBaSK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3RzsvzrvzsWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lRgA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnft b6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZhdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9f YjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/t W5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBaSK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3RzsvzrvzsWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lRgA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnft b6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZhdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9f YjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/t W5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBaSK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3RzsvzrvzsWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit>↵x
<latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lR gA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZ hdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxq ihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9fYjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8 qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5 dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/tW5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBa SK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3Rzsvzrvz sWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lR gA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZ hdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxq ihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9fYjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8 qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5 dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/tW5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBa SK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3Rzsvzrvz sWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lR gA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZ hdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxq ihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9fYjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8 qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5 dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/tW5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBa SK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3Rzsvzrvz sWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PFYWUIppRqOu4lR gA9z86mSgAYE=">AAAB8XicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5gG8pku2mXbjZ hdyOW0H/hxYMiXv033vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxq ihr0ljEqhOgZoJL1jTcCNZJFMMoEKwdjG9m9fYjU5rH8t5MEuZHOJQ85BSNtR4qPRTJCMlTpV8 qu1V3LrIKXg5lyNXol756g5imEZOGCtS667mJ8TNUhlPBpsVeqlmCdIxD1rUoMWLaz+YbT8m5 dQYkjJV90pC5+3siw0jrSRTYzgjNSC/XZuZ/tW5qwms/4zJJDZN08VGYCmJiMjufDLhi1IiJBa SK210JHaFCamxIRRuCt3zyKrRqVc/yXa1cv8zjKMApnMEFeHAFdbiFBjSBgoRneIU3Rzsvzrvz sWhdc/KZE/gj5/MHdzGQEA==</latexit>
 x
<latexit sha1_base64="WxzptEb8RpJ4VT5b DtW2kqOV13o=">AAAB8HicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5IG8pmO2mXbjZhdy OW0F/hxYMiXv053vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqhg2W Sxi1QmoRsElNg03AjuJQhoFAtvB+GZWbz+i0jyW92aSoB/RoeQhZ9RY66HSC9BQ8lTpl8pu1Z2Lr IKXQxlyNfqlr94gZmmE0jBBte56bmL8jCrDmcBpsZdqTCgb0yF2LUoaofaz+cJTcm6dAQljZZ80 ZO7+nshopPUkCmxnRM1IL9dm5n+1bmrCaz/jMkkNSrb4KEwFMTGZXU8GXCEzYmKBMsXtroSNqKLM 2IyKNgRv+eRVaNWqnuW7Wrl+mcdRgFM4gwvw4ArqcAsNaAKDCJ7hFd4c5bw4787HonXNyWdO4I+ czx+uHI+c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WxzptEb8RpJ4VT5b DtW2kqOV13o=">AAAB8HicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5IG8pmO2mXbjZhdy OW0F/hxYMiXv053vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqhg2W Sxi1QmoRsElNg03AjuJQhoFAtvB+GZWbz+i0jyW92aSoB/RoeQhZ9RY66HSC9BQ8lTpl8pu1Z2Lr IKXQxlyNfqlr94gZmmE0jBBte56bmL8jCrDmcBpsZdqTCgb0yF2LUoaofaz+cJTcm6dAQljZZ80 ZO7+nshopPUkCmxnRM1IL9dm5n+1bmrCaz/jMkkNSrb4KEwFMTGZXU8GXCEzYmKBMsXtroSNqKLM 2IyKNgRv+eRVaNWqnuW7Wrl+mcdRgFM4gwvw4ArqcAsNaAKDCJ7hFd4c5bw4787HonXNyWdO4I+ czx+uHI+c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WxzptEb8RpJ4VT5b DtW2kqOV13o=">AAAB8HicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5IG8pmO2mXbjZhdy OW0F/hxYMiXv053vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqhg2W Sxi1QmoRsElNg03AjuJQhoFAtvB+GZWbz+i0jyW92aSoB/RoeQhZ9RY66HSC9BQ8lTpl8pu1Z2Lr IKXQxlyNfqlr94gZmmE0jBBte56bmL8jCrDmcBpsZdqTCgb0yF2LUoaofaz+cJTcm6dAQljZZ80 ZO7+nshopPUkCmxnRM1IL9dm5n+1bmrCaz/jMkkNSrb4KEwFMTGZXU8GXCEzYmKBMsXtroSNqKLM 2IyKNgRv+eRVaNWqnuW7Wrl+mcdRgFM4gwvw4ArqcAsNaAKDCJ7hFd4c5bw4787HonXNyWdO4I+ czx+uHI+c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WxzptEb8RpJ4VT5b DtW2kqOV13o=">AAAB8HicbZBNS8NAEIYnftb6VfXoZbEVPJWkCHosePFYwX5IG8pmO2mXbjZhdy OW0F/hxYMiXv053vw3btsctPWFhYd3ZtiZN0gE18Z1v5219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NJxqhg2W Sxi1QmoRsElNg03AjuJQhoFAtvB+GZWbz+i0jyW92aSoB/RoeQhZ9RY66HSC9BQ8lTpl8pu1Z2Lr IKXQxlyNfqlr94gZmmE0jBBte56bmL8jCrDmcBpsZdqTCgb0yF2LUoaofaz+cJTcm6dAQljZZ80 ZO7+nshopPUkCmxnRM1IL9dm5n+1bmrCaz/jMkkNSrb4KEwFMTGZXU8GXCEzYmKBMsXtroSNqKLM 2IyKNgRv+eRVaNWqnuW7Wrl+mcdRgFM4gwvw4ArqcAsNaAKDCJ7hFd4c5bw4787HonXNyWdO4I+ czx+uHI+c</latexit>
 x
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Figure 2. A slope-restricted nonlinearity (left) and a sector-
bounded nonlinearity (right).
Comparing (9) and (10), we see that the sector bound condi-
tion is a special case of the slope restriction condition when
φ(x?) = x? = 0. As a result, a slope-restricted nonlinearity
with φ(0) = 0 is also sector bounded; see Figure 2 for an
illustration.
In the context of neural networks, our interest is in repeated
nonlinearities of the form (3). Furthermore, the activation
values might be bounded from below or above (e.g., the
ReLU function which outputs a nonnegative value). The
quadratic inequality in (10) is too conservative and does not
capture these properties. In the following, we discuss QCs
for these properties.
3.3.2. REPEATED NONLINEARITIES
Suppose ϕ : R → R is slope-restricted on [α, β] and let
φ(x) = [ϕ(x1) · · ·ϕ(xd)]> be a vector-valued function
constructed by component-wise repetition of ϕ. It is not
hard to verify that φ is also slope-restricted in the same
sector. However, this representation simply ignores the
fact that all the nonlinearities that compose φ are the same.
By taking advantage of this structure, we can refine the
quadratic constraint that describes φ. To be specific, for
an input-output pair (x, φ(x)), x ∈ Rd, we can write the
inequality
(φi−φj−α(xi−xj))(φi−φj−β(xi−xj)) ≤ 0, (12)
for all i, j = 1, · · · , d, i 6= j. This particular QC consider-
ably reduces conservatism, especially for deep networks, as
it reasons about the coupling between the neurons through-
out the entire network. By making an analogy to dynamical
systems, we can interpret the neural network as a time-
varying discrete-time dynamical system where the same
nonlinearity is repeated for all time indexes k (the layer
number). Then the QC in (12) couples all the possible neu-
rons.
Lemma 1 (repeated nonlinearities) Suppose ϕ : R → R
is slope-restricted on [α, β]. Then the vector-valued function
φ(x) = [ϕ(x1) ϕ(x2) · · ·ϕ(xd)]> satisfies[
x
φ
]> [ −2αβT (α+ β)T
(α+ β)T −2T
] [
x
φ
]
≥ 0. (13)
where T =
∑
1≤i<j≤d λij(ei − ej)(ei − ej)>, λij ≥ 0,
and ei is the i-th unit vector in Rd.
There are several results in the literature about repeated non-
linearities. For instance, in (D’amato et al., 2001; Kulkarni
& Safonov, 2002), the authors derive QCs for repeated and
odd nonlinearities (e.g. tanh function).
3.3.3. BOUNDED NONLINEARITIES
Finally, suppose the nonlinear function values are bounded,
i.e., ϕ ≤ ϕ(z) ≤ ϕ¯ for all z ∈ R. This bound is equivalent
to
(ϕ− ϕ)(ϕ− ϕ¯) ≤ 0. (14)
We can write a similar inequality when the pre- activation
values are known to be bounded.
We observe that the inequalities (12)-(14) are all quadratic
in x and φ(x), and therefore can be encapsulated into QCs
of the form (8). As we show in §4, the matrix Q ∈ Q that
abstracts the nonlinearities appears as a decision variable in
the SDP.
3.4. Quadratic Constraints for Activation Functions
To connect the results of the previous two subsections to acti-
vation functions in neural networks, we recall the following
result from (Heath & Wills, 2005).
Lemma 2 (gradient of convex functions) Consider a
function g : Rd → R that is α-convex and β-smooth. Then
the gradient function ∇g : Rd → Rd is slope-restricted in
the sector [α, β].
Notably, all activation functions used in deep neural net-
works are gradients of convex functions. They therefore
belong to the class of slope-restricted nonlinearities, accord-
ing to Lemma 2. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 The following statements hold true.
(a) The ReLU function ϕ(x) = max(0, x) : R → R is
slope-restricted and sector-bounded in the sector [0, 1].
(b) The sigmoid function, ϕ(x) = 11+e−x : R → R is
slope-restricted in the sector [0, 1].
(c) The tanh function, ϕ(x) = tanh(x) : R→ R is slope-
restricted and sector-bounded in the sector [0, 1].
(d) The leaky ReLU function, ϕ(x) = axI(x < 0) +
xI(x ≥ 0) with a > 0 is slope-restricted and sector-
bounded in the sector [min(a, 1),max(a, 1)].
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(e) The exponential linear function (ELU), ϕ(x) =
xI(x ≥ 0) + a(ex − 1)I(x < 0) with a > 0 is slope-
restricted and sector-bounded in the sector [0, 1].
(f) The softmax function, φ(x) =
[ e
x1∑d
i=1 e
xi
· · · exd∑d
i=1 e
xi
]> : Rd → Rd is slope-
restricted in the sector [0, 1].
Proof It is easy to show that each of the activation functions
mentioned above is the gradient of a convex function.
Although the above rules can be used to guide the search
for valid QCs for activation functions, a less conservative
description of activation functions requires a case-by-case
treatment to further exploit the structure of the nonlinearity.
For instance, the ReLU function precisely lies on the bound-
ary of the sector [0, 1]. Indeed, it can be described by the
following constraints (Raghunathan et al., 2018b):
y = max(0, x) ⇐⇒ xy = y2, y ≥ x, y ≥ 0. (15)
The first constraint is the boundary of the sector [0, 1] and
the other constraints simply prune these boundaries to re-
cover the ReLU function. In the following lemma, we pro-
vide a full QC characterization of the ReLU function.
Lemma 3 (QC for ReLU function) The ReLU function,
φ(x) = max(0, x) : Rd → Rd, satisfies the QC defined
by Q where
Q =
Q ∈ S2d+1 :
 0 T −νT −2T ν+η
−ν> ν>+η> 0
 . (16)
Here η, ν ≥ 0 and T ∈ Sd+ is given by
T =
d∑
i=1
λieie
>
i +
d−1∑
i=1
d∑
j>i
λij(ei − ej)(ei − ej)>.
with λi ∈ R and λij ≥ 0.
Deriving non-conservative QCs for the other functions
(other than ReLU) is more complicated as they are not on the
boundary of any sector. However, by bounding these func-
tions at multiple points by sector bounds of the form (10),
we can obtain a substantially better over-approximation. In
Figure 3, we illustrate this idea for the tanh function.
4. SDP for One-layer Neural Networks
For the sake of simplicity in the exposition, we start with
the analysis of one-layer neural networks and then extend
the results to the multi-layer case in §5. In the following
theorem, we put all the pieces together to develop an SDP
that can assert whether Y ⊆ S.
x
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Figure 3. The curve of the tanh function over-approximated by the
intersection of three sectors.
Theorem 1 (SDP for one layer) Consider a one-layer
neural network f : Rnx → Rny described by the equations
y = W 1φ(W 0x+ b0) + b1, (17)
Suppose x ∈ X ⊂ Rnx , where X is bounded and satisfies
the quadratic constraint defined by P , i.e., for any P ∈ P ,[
x
1
]>
P
[
x
1
]
≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , (18)
Furthermore, suppose φ satisfies the quadratic constraint
defined by Q, i.e., for any Q ∈ Q, zφ(z)
1
>Q
 zφ(z)
1
 ≥ 0 for all z. (19)
Consider the following matrix inequality:
Min +Mmid +Mout  0. (20)
where
Min =
Inx 00 0
0 1
P [Inx 0 0
0 0 1
]
, (21a)
Mmid =
W 0
>
0 0
0 In1 0
b0
>
0 1
Q
W 0 0 b00 In1 0
0 0 1
 , (21b)
Mout =
 0 0W 1> 0
b1
>
1
S [0 W 1 b10 0 1
]
, (21c)
and S ∈ Sny is a given symmetric matrix. If (20) is feasible
for some (P,Q) ∈ P ×Q, then[
y
1
]>
S
[
y
1
]
≤ 0 for all x ∈ X .
Theorem 1 states that if the matrix inequality (20) is feasible
for some (P,Q) ∈ P × Q, then we can certify that the
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network is safe with respect to the perturbation set X and
safety specification set S, i.e., f(X ) ⊆ S. Since P and Q
are both convex, (20) is a linear matrix inequality (LMI)
feasibility problem and, hence, can be efficiently solved via
interior-point method solvers for convex optimization.
The crux of our idea in the development of Theorem 1 is
the S-procedure (Yakubovich, 1997), a technique to reason
about multiple quadratic constraints, and is frequently used
in robust control and optimization (Boyd et al., 1994; Ben-
Tal et al., 2009).
4.1. Certified Upper Bounds
In Theorem 1, we developed a feasibility problem to assert
whether the output set Y is enclosed in the safe set S. In
particular, if S is described by the half-space
S = {y | a>y − b ≤ 0}, (22)
with a given a and b, then the feasibility of the LMI in
Theorem 1 implies Y ⊆ S, or equivalently,
a>f(x) ≤ b for all x ∈ X . (23)
In other words, b is a certified upper bound on the quan-
tity a>f(x). Now if treat b as a decision variable, we can
optimize this bound by minimizing b subject to the LMI
constraint in (20). This is particularly useful for reachability
analysis, where the goal is to over approximate the output
set Y by a polyhedron of the form
Y˜ = ∩i
{
y ∈ Rny : a>i y − bi ≤ 0
}
,
where ai are given and the goal is to find the smallest value
of bi for all i such that Y ⊆ Y˜ .
5. Multi-layer Neural Networks
In this section, we turn to multi-layer neural networks. As-
suming that all the activation functions are the same across
the layers (repetition across layers), we can concatenate
all the pre- and post-activation signals together and form a
more compact representation. To see this, we first introduce
x = [x0
> · · ·x`>]>, where ` is the number of hidden layers.
Then, we can write (2) compactly as
Bx = φ(Ax + b), (24a)
y = Cx + b`.
where
A =

W 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 W 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · W `−1 0
 b =

b0
b1
...
b`−1
 ,
B =
0 I · · · 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · I
 C = [0 0 · · · W `] . (24b)
In the following result, we develop the multi-layer counter-
part of Theorem 4 for the model in (24).
Theorem 2 (SDP for multiple layers) Consider the multi-
layer neural network described by (24). Suppose X ⊂ Rnx
and φ satisfy the quadratic constraints defined by P and
Q, respectively, as in (18) and (19). Consider the following
LMI.
Min +Mmid +Mout  0, (25)
where
Min =
[
Inx 0
0 1
]>
P
[
Inx 0
0 1
]
, (26a)
Mmid =
A bB 0
0 1
>Q
A bB 0
0 1
 , (26b)
Mout =
[
C b`
0 1
]>
S
[
C b`
0 1
]
, (26c)
and S ∈ Sny is a given symmetric matrix. If (25) is feasible
for some (P,Q) ∈ P ×Q, then[
y
1
]>
S
[
y
1
]
≤ 0 for all x ∈ X .
6. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the numerical aspects of our
approach. For solving the SDP, we used MOSEK (ApS,
2017) with CVX (CVX Research, 2012) on a 5-core per-
sonal computer with 8GB of RAM. We start off with the
computational complexity of the proposed SDP.
6.1. Computational Complexity
Input set. The quadratic constraint that over-approximates
the input set X is indexed by O(n2x) decision variables,
where nx is the input dimension. However, if we use a
diagonal matrix Γ in (6), we can reduce the number of
decision variables toO(nx) without significantly increasing
the conservatism.
Activation functions. For a network with N hidden neu-
rons, if we use all possible quadratic constraints, the number
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Table 1. Comparison between the solve times of the SDP (this
paper), and the SDR (Raghunathan et al., 2018b)) for a varying
number of nodes. The SDR approach runs out of memory (oom)
for networks larger than 1600 neurons.
Number of neurons Solve time
SDP (this paper) SDR
200 3.2 2.7
400 11.3 20.4
800 78.6 149.1
1200 311.2 799.1
1600 1072.6 OOM
2000 1249.7 OOM
3000 3126.5 OOM
of decision variables will be O(N + N2), which is the
same number of decision variables as in (Raghunathan et al.,
2018b). For the one-layer case, if we ignore repeated non-
linearities, we arrive at O(N) decision variables. In our
numerical experiments, we did not observe any additional
conservatism after removing repeated nonlinearities across
the neurons of the same layer. However, accounting for
repeated nonlinearities was very effective for the case of
multiple layers.
Safety specification set. The number of decision variables
for the safety specification set depends on how we would
like to bound the output set. For instance, for finding a single
hyperplane, we have only one decision variable. For the
case of ellipsoids, there will be O(n2y) decision variables.
6.2. Experiments
In Figure 4, we compare the bounds for a network with
nx = 2 inputs, ny = 10 outputs, and a varying number of
hidden layers with 100 neurons per layer. We observe that
the bounds obtained by the SDP remain relatively accurate
as a result of including repeated nonlinearities. In the sup-
plementary material, we visualize the over-approximations
for different scenarios. In Figure 5 we depict the effect of
the number of layers on the quality of approximation; in
Figure 6, we show the effect of number of hidden neurons
on the quality of approximation for a single-layer network,
and in Figure 7, we change the perturbation size .
In Table 1, we report the computation time (CVX overhead
included) for a network with one hidden layer and a varying
number of neurons. We observe that the SDR of (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018b) runs out of memory for larger networks
(1600 in the computer used for this experiment). However,
the SDP of this paper can solve networks of up to size 5000
with the same memory.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of hidden layers
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
su
p x
2X
c>
f(
x)
Exact value
SDP (this paper)
SDR (Raghunathan et al., 2018b)
Figure 4. Comparison of the bounds with the ground truth for a
network with nx = 2, ny = 10, random selection of the weights
and biases, and varying number of hidden layers with 100 neurons
per layer. The hyperplane vector c is chosen as the vector of all
ones.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an SDP for robustness analy-
sis and safety verification of feed-forward fully-connected
neural networks with general activation functions. We used
quadratic constraints to abstract various elements of the
problem, namely, the input uncertainty set, the safety spec-
ification set, and the nonlinear activation functions. To
reduce conservatism, we developed quadratic constraints
that are able to reason about the coupling between neurons
throughout the entire network. We focused on `∞ uncer-
tainty sets. However, we can consider any set that can be
over approximated by quadratic constraints, namely, ellip-
soids, polytopes, and zonotopes.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Note that the inequality x ≤ x ≤ x¯ implies
λij(xi − xi)>(x¯j − xj) ≥ 0, (27)
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, where λij ≥ 0. Summing the preceding
inequality over all i, j and denoting Γ = [λij ] ∈ Rd×d, we
will arrive at the claimed inequality. 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
For the pairs (xi, ϕ(xi)) and (xj , ϕ(xj)), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d,
we can write[
xi − xj
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(xj)
]> [−2αβ α+ β
α+ β −2
] [
xi − xj
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(xj)
]
≥ 0.
(28)
By substituting[
xi − xj
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(xj)
]
=
[
(ei − ej)> 0
0 (ei − ej)>
] [
x
φ(x)
]
,
into (28), we obtain[
x
φ(x)
]> [ −2αβEij (α+ β)Eij
(α+ β)Eij −2
] [
x
φ(x)
]
≥ 0, (29)
where Eij = (ei − ej)(ei − ej)>. Multiplying both sides
of (29) by λij ≥ 0 and summing over all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d
will yield the desired result. 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the equivalence in (15) for the i-th coordinate of
the activation function y = max(x, 0) x ∈ Rd:
y2i = xiyi yi ≥ xi yi ≥ 0 (30)
Multiplying the constraints by λi ∈ R, νi ∈ R+, and ηi ∈
R+, respectively and adding them together, we obtainxiyi
1
>  λi −νiλi −2λi νi + ηi
−νi νi + ηi 0
xiyi
1
 ≥ 0. (31)
Substituting xiyi
1
 =
e>i 0 00 e>i 0
0 0 1
xy
1
 ,
back into (31), we getxy
1
>  0 λieie>i −νieiλieie>i −2λieie>i (νi + ηi)ei
−νie>i (νi + ηi)e>i 0
xy
1
 ≥ 0.
(32)
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On the other hand, since y = max(0, x) is a repeated non-
linearity, it satisfies the inequalityxy
1
>  −2αβT (α+ β)T 0(α+ β)T −2T 0
0 0 0
xy
1
 ≥ 0. (33)
according to Lemma 1, where the expression for T is given
in the lemma. Adding (33) and (31) for all i = 1, · · · , d
yields the desired QC for the ReLU function. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 1
Using the assumption that φ satisfies the QC defined by
Q, we can write the following QC from the identity x1 =
φ(W 0x0 + b0):W 0x0 + b0x1
1
>Q
W 0x0 + b0x1
1
 ≥ 0, for all Q ∈ Q.
(34)
By substituting the identityW 0x0 + b0x1
1
 =
W 0 0 b00 In1 0
0 0 1
x0x1
1
 , (35)
back into (34) and denoting x = [x0> x1>]>, we can write
the inequality
[
x
1
]> W 0 0 b00 In1 0
0 0 1
>Q
W 0 0 b00 In1 0
0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mmid
[
x
1
]
≥ 0,
(36)
for all Q ∈ Q. Next, by assumption X satisfies the QC
defined by P . The corresponding quadratic inequality can
be written as [
x0
1
]>
P
[
x0
1
]
≥ 0.
for all x0 ∈ X . The above QC can be written as[
x
1
]> I 00 0
0 1
> P [I 0 0
0 0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min
[
x
1
]
≥ 0, (37)
for all P ∈ P and all x0 ∈ X . Suppose (20) holds for some
(P,Q) ∈ P ×Q. By left- and right- multiplying both sides
of (19) by [x> 1] and [x> 1]>, respectively, we obtain[
x
1
]>
Min
[
x
1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (37)
+
[
x
1
]>
Mmid
[
x
1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (36)
+
[
x
1
]>
Mout
[
x
1
]
≤ 0.
Therefore, the last term on the left-hand side must be non-
positive for all x0 ∈ X , or, equivalently,x0x1
1
>
 0 0W 1> 0
b1
>
1
S [0 W 1 b10 0 1
]x0x1
1
 ≤ 0. (38)
Using the relation y = W 1x1 + b1, the above inequality can
be written as[
y
1
]>
S
[
y
1
]
≤ 0 for all x0 ∈ X .
The proof is now complete. 
A.5. Proof of Theorem 2
Since φ satisfies the QC defined by Q, we can write the
following QC from the identity Bx = φ(Ax + b):Ax + bBx
1
>Q
Ax + bBx
1
 ≥ 0 for all Q ∈ Q. (39)
The preceding inequality is equivalent to[
x
1
]> A bB 0
0 1
>Q
A bB 0
0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mmid
[
x
1
]
≥ 0, (40)
for all Q ∈ Q. Next, by assumption X satisfies the QC
defined by P . The corresponding quadratic inequality can
be written as[
x
1
]> [
Inx 0
0 1
]>
P
[
Inx 0
0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min
[
x
1
]
≥ 0, (41)
for all P ∈ P and all x ∈ X . Suppose (25) holds for some
(P,Q) ∈ P ×Q. By left- and right- multiplying both sides
of (19) by [x> 1] and [x> 1]>, respectively, we obtain[
x
1
]>
Min
[
x
1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (41)
+
[
x
1
]>
Mmid
[
x
1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (40)
+
[
x
1
]>
Mout
[
x
1
]
≤ 0.
for all x ∈ X . Therefore, the last quadratic term must be
nonpositive, from where we can write[
x
1
]> [
C b`
0 1
]>
S
[
C b`
0 1
] [
x
1
]
≤ 0, (42)
for all x ∈ X . Using the relation y = Cx + b` from (24),
the above inequality can be written as[
y
1
]>
S
[
y
1
]
≤ 0, for all x ∈ X .
The proof is now complete. 
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Figure 5. Illustrations of the output set (blue), the polytope obtained from the results of this paper (red), and the polytope obtained by
the semidefinite relaxation of (Raghunathan et al., 2018b). The number of neurons per layer is 100, the weights are chosen randomly
using the Gaussian distribution, and the input set is the `∞ norm with x? = (0.5, 0.5) and  = 0.1. From the left to right and top to
bottom, the number of hidden layers is 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 (the activation function is ReLU). We observe that by the inclusion of repeated
nonlinearities, our method is able to provide tighter bounds.
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Figure 6. The effect of the number of hidden neurons on the over approximation quality of the SDP for a one-layer neural network with
100 (left), 500 (middle), and 1000 hidden nuerons (right). The activation function is ReLU. Quadratic constraints for repeated nonlinearity
are not included.
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Figure 7. The effect of  (the `∞ norm of the input set) on the over approximation quality of the SDP for  = 0.1 (left),  = 0.4 (middle),
and  = 0.8 (right). The network architecture is 2-500-2 with ReLU activation functions. Quadratic constraints for repeated nonlinearity
are not included.
